This article analyzes the significance of the 12 June 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum in the Republic of Ireland. This was the third such referendum on Europe held in Ireland since the millennium, and the second referendum in three to result in a rejection of an EU Treaty following the failed Nice poll in 2001. Assessing both the campaign itself and the reasons for the No vote, the article argues that whilst variables such as age, educational attainment, geography, gender and social class all have a part to play in explaining the outcome of the referendum, post-referendum analysis suggests that two key phenomena proved decisive. First, an enduring Irish attachment to an overwhelmingly exclusivist national identity rather than more open and fluid identity conceptions, means that a space exists where issues such as neutrality, sovereignty and Ireland's relative influence in the EU institutional matrix can be readily exploited by opponents of the European integration process, and where any changes in the EU constitutional order can be emotively presented as an existential threat to Ireland's values and interests. Second, post-referendum analysis also suggests that lack of knowledge constituted a key reason for voting No. The absence of any effort by government to provide and promote sufficient information channels which explain how and why Ireland's EU membership matters means that EU 'debates' within Irish political culture are frequently characterised by apathy, confusion, and ignorance, in a context where the chasm in elite-popular opinion has grown wider. The referendum result also points to a growing Eurosceptic tendency in 
In doing so it draws upon the data presented in two key postreferendum research papers. 3 The first section sets out two significant background issues which help contextualise how the campaign unfolded. The second section focuses upon the campaign itself, the coalitions which emerged for and against the treaty, the key issues raised in the course of the campaign, and the controversy generated around these issues. It also analyses the polarisation of forces which manifested itself as anti-system Euro-sceptics hostile to the Treaty against the Euro- 
Background and Context
Before considering how the campaign unfolded in Ireland there are two important background issues which need to be examined. The evolution of the EU constitutional order has seen member states develop their own specific instruments of legal adaptation amid a plurality of approaches to political legitimation in particularistic national contexts. In formal legal terms ratification is deemed the prerogative of each individual member state and it is up to each state to decide its own preferred method of constitutional approval: in the case of the Lisbon Treaty 26 of the 27 states opted for a parliamentary vote. 4 In the Irish case ratification takes place through popular referendum, on foot of the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in the celebrated
Crotty case of 1987. 5 The dominant interpretation of that judgment was that any further change in the EU constitutional order with implications for Irish sovereignty had to be legitimated through referendum rather than parliamentary statute. No Irish government has been prepared to challenge the constitutionality of an EU treaty before the Supreme Court since that time and no such action was contemplated in respect of the Lisbon Treaty. This is despite the fact that Crotty expressly authorises the ratification of EU treaties by statute provided that 'such amendments do not alter the essential scope or objectives' of the existing European Union. 6 The only aspect of the Single European Act (SEA) that the Court felt required constitutional amendment -and this only by a 3 to 2 majority -was Title III, which pertained to European security and foreign policy. It is absolutely clear that all other institutional and procedural innovations contained in the Single European Act could as easily have been introduced by statute of the Oireachtas. Indeed, as Ruth Barrington points out, successive enlargements of the EU have been ratified by the Oireachtas rather than by referendum, and it is at least arguable that these have altered the essential scope and/or objectives of the EU far more than actual treaty change. 7 Viewed from this perspective the government would have been perfectly justified in incorporating the very modest institutional changes attached to the Lisbon Treaty into Irish law by statute rather than constitutional amendment. Given that the Lisbon Treaty contained only limited movement towards further 'deepening' of foreign and security policy, and leaves intact each member state's absolute sovereignty in foreign affairs, it might have seemed to some as inherently sensible for the government to opt for parliamentary ratification or at least to test the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty before the Supreme Court in advance of or in preference to the much more risky route of a popular referendum. did not necessarily present a threat to Irish interests. In the consensus-seeking environment of Brussels the veto was little more than a mythical realpolitik construct:
the consensual nature of EU decision-making processes is such that the zero sum calculations of the No side do not equate with reality. As Brigid Laffan pointed out:
'the hard evidence is that the EU system remains largely driven by consensus. Only Cole of PANA. 23 The ECJ was continually interpreting the treaties in a way which favoured 'competition' over labour and local collective bargaining arrangements. In particular the Laval and Viking judgments featured strongly in No arguments, as 'evidence' of ECJ perfidy. Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) over the years and yet seem less than reconciled to the European integration process. 27 The strongest Yes vote, in the country was, unsurprisingly, recorded in affluent Dun Laoighaire in south east Dublin with a 63.5%
The outcome: Ireland votes no (again)
Yes vote, the strength of which highlights the significant occupational polarization in voting patterns -attitudes to the EU derived from social status are quite striking in Ireland as elsewhere. One important manifestation of this cleavage can be evinced in turnout figures: while 57% of white collar workers voted only 48% of blue collar workers did so. 28 There was considerable support for the Treaty among the liberal professional and executive classes, and educational attainment influencing subjective assessment of knowledge of the treaty proved a strong indicator of support for the Treaty. In fact during the campaign there was a 25 point gap between levels of subjectively assessed knowledge as between those in upper middle and middle class occupations and those in working class occupations. 29 The Eurobarometer survey demonstrates that the main supporters of the Treaty were indeed to be found in the higher occupational classes: senior managers (66%), the 'self-employed' (60%), professionals (58%), and those with higher levels of education (57% 37 Sinnott's conclusion, a qualified one, is that 'running an integrationist referendum in a political culture in which almost two thirds of the electorate feel themselves to belong exclusively to a certain national identity is never going to be a walkover'. Turning finally to the party political arena there appears to have been significant divergence from party positions among party members. 43 Table 2 . 44 Midway through the campaign then-Libertas executive director Naoise Nunn asserted that the group's strategy was based around targeting 'people in the mainstream parties who have their doubts'. 45 The evidence suggests that this strategy proved highly successful. Undoubtedly also divisions and bickering amongst the main parties did not help the Yes case. Taoiseach Brian Cowen accused Fine Gael and Labour of not doing enough to make the case for Lisbon. 46 In return Fine Gael charged that Fianna Fáil had mobilized far later than them and far too late to be effective.
The lack of conviction and lacklustre mobilisation efforts of the three largest parties 
Conclusion
The rejection of the Lisbon Treaty plunged Ireland into a profound political crisis, not least because EU leaders indicated an unwillingness to re-negotiate any part of the Treaty: it would be up to Ireland to find an Irish solution to this European problem.
Coinciding with this impasse in Irish-EU relations an economic recession began to present serious difficulties as the public finances deteriorated to their worst state in 25 years thus presenting Brian Cowen's government with the most challenging set of circumstances in which to think about moving forward. 47 The Irish rejection of Lisbon also led directly to ratification problems in other member states as procedures were set in motion by Euro-sceptic actors in the Czech Republic, Poland and other states to legally challenge domestic ratification processes.
The outcome of the referendum may seem paradoxical to some in that 
